Capability

Agents and tools, under the same audit chain.

Meilynx traces full agent execution, enforces tool allow/deny at the proxy boundary, detects drift from the approved baseline, and gates high-risk actions behind fresh two-party approval. Each tool call the proxy evaluates lands in the same audit trail as a plain LLM call.

See a demo See inline enforcement

At the boundary

Enforced at the boundary your traffic crosses.

Agentic workloads multiply the number of model calls and tool invocations behind a single user action. Meilynx governs the ones that cross the proxy boundary and records them in the same tamper-evident chain as everything else.

One traced run · one chain

user actionsummarize holdingstraced
agent · llm callgpt-4o · 2.1k tokensallowed
tool · portfolio_readallowlistedallowed
tool · send_emailnot on allowlistblocked
sub-agent · retry 1same policy, same chainallowed

each step sealed into the same examination-ready audit chain

Tool allow / deny

Permit or block specific tools and MCP calls per policy, at the boundary.

Destructive-command prevention

Stop dangerous tool actions before they execute.

Full-execution tracing

Capture retries, tool calls, and sub-agent invocations as one traced run.

Schema & message limits

Enforce structured-output contracts and cap multi-step message counts.

Drift & approval gates

Agents change. Your baseline notices.

An agent's system prompt and tool grants drift: a new tool appears, a mandate quietly widens. Meilynx detects that drift in observed traffic, flags it for review, and can hold high-risk actions until a second person approves with a grant that expires.

drift → gate → approval · one chain

baseline · approved12 approved toolsbaseline
tool grant added · wire_transferoutside approved baselinedrift
high-risk call · wire_transferheld for approvalgated
second approver · grant issuedexpires automaticallyapproved
action allowed · recordedsealed to the audit chainsealed

each finding, hold, and approval, attributed and sealed

System-prompt drift

Detected from observed traffic against the approved baseline. A rewritten mandate is flagged for review before it becomes an incident.

Tool-grant drift

A new tool outside the approved set is flagged the moment it appears in traffic.

Two-party approval gates

High-risk tool actions wait for a fresh approval from a second person; grants expire, and the default is fail-closed.

Shadow-first rollout

Drift rules ship in shadow mode, so you observe findings on real traffic before any enforcement changes behavior.

Examination evidence

Agent actions, examiner-ready.

Traced runs, drift findings, gate holds, and approvals land in the same chain as every other event and surface in the examination package your compliance team hands over.

In the examination package

The approval-grant lifecycle, meaning who approved what, when, and when it expired, renders as examination evidence alongside the traced run.

Mapped to named controls

Drift and approval-gate rules map to named framework controls: model monitoring under SR 26-2, supervisory review under FINRA, change management under SOC 2. Each carries the same control-to-evidence traceability as every other rule.

Identity and access

Know which agent acted, and for whom.

An agent that calls your models and tools needs an identity of its own. Meilynx verifies it on each call, decides what the agent may do from that identity, and records it with the action.

An agent nobody approved starts calling models with a shared project key. It surfaces as a finding, and the project can refuse it until it is registered.
Agents can claim any name. Self-reported labels are kept for context, and only a credential Meilynx verified can allow, refuse, or scope an action.
Two agents share one deployment. Each is held to its own tools and budget.
An agent acts for a person. The record names the agent and the user it acted for.
A key leaks or an agent is retired. Revoke it once, and every proxy refuses it after its next policy update.

In the record

Each model and tool call carries the agent that made it, how its identity was verified, and the person it acted for, sealed into the same chain as the action itself. An examiner who asks who did this reads the answer from the record.

Agents, in context.

Inline policy enforcementThe same data-path enforcement, extended to tool calls.Examination-ready audit trailWhere traced agent runs are sealed for examination.

Get started

Bring agents into your audit trail

We'll walk through agent tracing, tool allow/deny, and agent identity on your own traffic.

See a demo